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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-ooocRANE COMPANY dba CRANE
SUPPLY COMPANY
I

PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Civil No. 15022

KEN DAHLE I MARV ERICKSON I
ZARBOCK, PLUMBERS
SUPPLY COMPANY, ALAN MASER,
MARJIE SADLER, and DOES I
through X,

EARL

DefendantsRespondents •

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks a modification of the judgment in
its favor which denied appellant the bulk of its claimed
damages.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried without jury before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft beginning on July 13 1 1976.

The lower

court held in favor of appellant but limited recovery to the
value of two sales diverted by respondents.

Judgment was

granted only as against respondents Dahle, Maser, Erickson
and Plumbers Supply, and not against respondents Zarbock and
Sadler.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-1- OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a finding of error in the lowE:
court's failure to find a conspiracy among a 11 respondent,
to injure appellant.

Appellant also seeks to have this

Court define and apply the proper measure of damages whi:
should include all losses suffered by appellant as a rest:
of respondents' actions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 30, 1976 respondents Dahle, Maser, Eq
and Sadler virtually simultaneously (and by prior arransq
each terminated their employment with appellant.

Prior 4

their actual termination, respondent Dahle before the enc
of March of 1976

(Tr. 1-50) negotiated for employmentwit

and was accepted by respondents Plumbers Supply and Zarbo:
as the water works manager for Plumbers Supply (Tr. 1·50),
As early as April 23, 1976

(Tr. 1-58) Dahle negotiated,orJ

and placed in the name of respondent Plumbers Supply water
works materials and inventory for the account of PlU!llbers
Supply.

Testimony on behalf of appellant showed the val>Ji

of such inventory to be in excess of $300,000.00.

Throu~t

the period in question Dahle participated in the projectJC
of appellant's sales and the orders of inventory based
such projections.

UfC:

(Tr. 1-60)

Prior to April 30, 1977 each of the employee

r:~

dents, agreed and permitted respondent Plumbers SupplY to::
S2) anno•'
a notice to each of appellant's customers (Tr. 1'I
loyee res[
a "new phone number" where all o f th e f ormer emp
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by
the Utah State Library.
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could be reached who would continue "the same fine service"
(Exhibit Pl-2).
April 30.

And that announcement was mailed prior to

(Tr. 1-54)
During the course of the trial, the Court was pre-

sented with and received evidence of overt acts alleged to
have been committed in the course an~nce·of the conspiracy among respondents.

It was established that the duties

of respondent Dahle encompassed ordering and checking of
water works inventory (Tr. 1-6) and that he had sales supervisory responsibility over respondents Erickson and Maser
(Tr. 1-7) involving 90 percent responsibility over water
oorks sales and maybe 10 percent plumbing industrials (Tr.
1-7 ).

Mr. Dahle's job description was contained within

appellant's manual of operating procedures (Exhibit Pl-l.P)
~d

as such his duties and responsibilities were well defined.

Mr. Dahle was responsible for preparation of sales books containing historical information of appellant's customers (Tr.
1-48) and he had access to a master print out containing the
names and addresses of each and every of appellant's customers.
Explicit procedures were maintained by appellant for preparing
and cataloging bids for future work and such bids were kept by
respondent Sadler (Tr. 1-12)
It is undisputed that respondents took with them or
destroyed the sales books used by respondents Erickson and Maser
(3-75), dumped a print-out in a garbage can ( 2-75 ), left

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the catalogues in the warehouse, and that such documents,,
required by appellant to maintain its business.

Judge Croi.

found that the action of respondents justified the issuanc,
of the temporary restraining order previously issued by Ju:
Sawaya.
At least as early as "around the end of March,,
could have been a little sooner . . . "

(Tr. 1-50) respond!:

Dahle contacted respondent Zarbock and thereafter had three
or four meetings (Tr. 1-56) relating to the possibility of
Dahle being employed by respondent Plumbers Supply.

Dahle

then advised respondents Erickson, Maser and Sadler of "a
possibility of employment with defendant Plumbers Supply"

Dahle~

:?robably about the first week of April (Tr. 1-51).

Zarbock prepared and Erickson, Maser and Sadler approved tl:;
notice of the change in employment (Tr. 1-51) and the same
was mailed to some if not all of appellant's customers on
rhursday, April 29

(Tr. 1-54) or the day before the Dahle,

Zrickson, Maser and Sadler gave notice of termination (Tr.
Dahle made arrangements on behalf of Plumbers Supply for
stocking and inventory of each of the six lines of water wo
materials set out in the announcement (Tr. 1-57) and placed
purchase orders on behalf of Plumbers Supply Company prior
to termination of his employment with appe 11 an t .

One purch

order is indisputably dated April 23, 1976 (Tr. 1-58)' and
· g the
other orders were negotiated at prices in effect dunn
month of April.

(Tr. 1-59)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the course of conversations between Dahle and
zarbock, Dahle projected sales for the months of May and June,
1976 of $180,000.00 to $200,000.00 (Tr. l-60).

Despite the

issuance of a temporary restraining order, respondent
Plumbers Supply Company came to within 60 to 65 percent of
t;;1ese projections.
During Dahle's employment at appellant, he alone was
responsible for preparing projections relating to the water
works business of its Salt Lake City Branch (Tr. 2-25).
Dahle was aware of the instructions of appellant's management
to keep inventory down (Tr. 2-26). During the course of his
activities he found that 30 to 60 days was fairly typical lead
time in ordering inventory (Tr. 2-46).

Despite the fact that Plumbers Supply had not previously been in the water works business, the projections prepared by Dahle for Zarbock approximated appellant's normal
sales (Tr. 3-34).

With experienced personnel it would take a

new venture at least 90 days to attain sales figures that were
projected by respondent, Plumbers Supply Co. (Tr. 3-35).
Inexperienced personnel would require at least one year to
attain such sales levels.

In

order for Plumbers Supply

to sell the amounts of materials actually sold in May and
June, a normal inventory of two month's supply or more would
be required (Tr. 3-38).

Plumbers Supply would have had to

place orders for approximately $300,000.00 of inventory in
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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order to project and meet its expected sales.
Appellant has calculated its damages with referance to its 26 water works accounts which represented 4l.J
precent of its total sales through the first four months
of 1976.

(Tr. 3-4 3} •

In May the precentage dropped from t

average of 41 percent to 7.4 percent.

(Tr. 3.43}.

Appellar

contrc.ller testified to a two months loss of $39,690.00
and that the projected loss to Crane would be $130,000.00
(Tr. 3-45}.
It is undisputed that on April 20 the Bountiful
City Water Department placed with the appellant an order for
200 meter boxes and 50 boxes were received on April 29.
(Tr. 3-68}.

After inquiry was made by Bountiful of Dahle at

his "new phone number" at Plumbers Supply, Bountiful was ad·
vised that the same were not back-ordered at appellant's
facility and that the boxes could be delivered out of
Supply inventory that day (Tr. 3-67}.

Pl~~

Bountiful's expectatii

was that the meters would be delivered in two shipments and
that the remaining 150 would come from appellant as soon as
they got them (Tr. 3-71}.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING A CONSPIRACY
BY RESPONDENTS.
The trial court awarded appellant limited damages
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against all respondents except Zarbock and Sadler after finding
tha respondents Dahle and Maser did
~!?.ordered

ne-t-aa*~de-:r

the---1.5.0

by Bountiful with the result that appellant

could not supply them and said order was subsequently diverted
to Plumbers Supply.

Additionally, the acts of Maser in diverting

a valve order were similarly held compensable against the
foregoing respondents.

(Findings p. 3)

The Memorandum Decision of the court however concluded
that the acts of diversion constituted the only basis for
money damages and that the evidence would not support any
finding that respondents were involved in a conspiracy to
defraud appellant of its customers or business.

(Me. Decision

p. 5 and 3 respectively).
It is submitted that the foregoing findings and
decision are inconsistent in law and in fact since the
gravamen of appellant's case is the participation by all
respondents in overt acts carried out in the course and
furtherance of a conspiracy to injure appellant in its business and that appellant in fact was injured in its business.
Having found the existence of at least two over,Jt
acts by Dahle and Maser and the complicity in such acts by
Plumbers Supply, the court could not as a

ma~t_e_r__o:(__l~w

Since
both the shipment of 150 meters and the taking of a valve
order by Plumbers supply (an unrelated third party competitor)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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would have been lawful acts but for the "breaches

o

f

respor,.

sibili ty" by Dahle and Maser, the court must have inferred
and imputed the liability of Dahle and Maser to Plumbers s~
in granting a joint judgment against those parties.
In DeVries v. Brumbeck, 53 Cal.2d 643, 2 Cal. Rpt
764, 349 P.2d 532 (1960) the relationship between proof of
conspiracy and the award of a joint judgment was explained
as follows:
In tort the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each
participant in the wrongful act responsible
as a joint tort-feasor for all damages ensuing
from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not
he was a direct actor and regardless of his
activity.
349 P.2d at 536.
In Schaefer v. Bernstein, 140 Cal. App.2d 278,
295 P.2d 113 (1956), the court similarly held:
A plaintiff is entitled to a joint recovery
of damages against such defendants as he c~
show have united or cooperated in inflicting
a wrong upon him. 295 P.2d at 123.
The tort of "diversion", if indeed it is a

separa~

tort, was neither pleaded by appellant nor acknowledged by ti
court to be in the case.

At no time during the course of

trial did either the court or ~ respondents seek to limit
or strike the testimony of particular respondents relating
to the alleged conspiracy and such testimony was received as
against all defendants.

Accordingly, the only subs tan~

basis for the court's award of a joint judgment wou ld

have he:
~

to have been upon finding that a conspiracy was proven~

-a-
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that plaintiff was damaged

as a result thereof.

POINT II
THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THE RECORD ARE SUFFICIENT
TO SHOW THAT THE RESPONDENTS CONSPIRED TO INJURE APPELLANT
IN VIOLATION OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY.

Under the present Utah case law the Findings of
Fact and the

inferenc~which

can be drawn from the evidence

fully support the conclusion that the respondents conspired
to injure the appellant in violation of their fiduciary duty
to the appellant.

The trial below was made to the court,

therefore this Court has the right to review all aspects of
the record as to inferences and conclusions drawn from the
evidence in the court below therein.

It is submitted that

me evidence in the court below compels the conclusion that
the employee-respondents had a fiduciary obligation of loyalty during the time they were employed by appellant which
continued thereafter as long as they possessed proprietary
information.

This fiduciary obligation required that the

respondent employees conduct themselves so as to not cause
injuries to appellant.
In the case of Hoggan & Hall & Higgens, Inc. v.
~,

18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1969), this court faced a

case very similar to the instant one.

-9-

In the Hoggan case

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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key employees and officers of the employer therein diverted business from the employer to themselves, and while
still working for the employer, set up a competing company,
They thereafter resigned from the employer and entered into
direct competition to the detriment of their former employe:
This Court held that those actions constituted a breach of
the fiduciary duty owed by an employee to his employer and
consequently upheld an award of damages to the employer.
In the instant case, respondents conspired to the detriment
of their employer, appellant herein.
The explanation of an employee 1 s fiduciary duty
given in Duane Jones Company, Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172,
117 N.E.2d 237

(1954) was cited with strong approval by this

Court in the Hoggan case, supra.

In Duane Jones Company, ke,

employees of plaintiff 1 s advertising business conspired to a:
actually solici tated customers of their employer, created a
competing corporation and diverted business to that corporat:
The defendants also convinced several key employees to resi~:
from employment with the plaintiff and to work for the defeni

ant 1 a competitor.

Even though the customers of the plainti:

were not contrac:tually bound and were free to cancel their
agreement with plaintiff at any time 1 the Court granted jud9·
ment for plaintiff in the form of damages

1

including profits

lOSt by the plaintiff becaUSe Of the defendantS

I

actionS,

The court described the duty of the defendants as follows:

-10-by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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"The inferences reasonably to be drawn
from the record justify the conclusion
. . . that the individual defendants appellants, while employees of plaintiff
corporation, determined upon a course of
conduct which, when subsequently carried
out, resulted in benefit to themselved
through destruction of plaintiff's business, in violation of the fiduciary
duties of good faith and fair dealing
imposed on defendants by their close relationship with plaintiff corporation."
117 N.E.2d at 245.
In the Hoggan case, supra, this Court defined with
substantial certainty the standard the defendants were required
to meet in the instant case:
"It is difficult to go along with the
urgence that there is no solicitation
of the accounts or that there was no
breach of a confidential relation with
the corporation under such circumstances,
particularly when Hall and Higgins admitted in the record that they had on at least
one occasion solicited one of the accounts
to obtain its future business. This of itself confesses a tort." 414 P.2d at 91
The cause of action pleaded and proven during the
course of the trial was injury to the business of appellant
through various improper acts of the respondents, including
the diversion of particular items of business, interference
with appellant's business ability and by direct competition
with appellant.

Having found diversion and collective action,

the trial court nevertheless failed to find for appellant on
the question of conspiracy and declined to grant to appellant
the damage which may be proven by any number of definite
actions, conditions, and circumstances occasioned by the broad
conspiracy alleged.

It is settled law that:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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''A conspiracy may be inferred from the
nature of the actions done, the relationships of the parties and the interests of the alleged conspirators and
other.circurnstances." Horn v. Ruess,
72 ArH. 132, 231 P.2d 756 (1951).
A conspiracy has also been described as being:
"Merely a combination of two or more
persons to accomplish an evil or unlawful purpose." Southern California
Disinfecting Company, supra, at 54.
Each of the common elements of civil conspiracy
are supported by the findings of the court below.

These

elements are set out in Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, :.
Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193

(1954):

"To constitute a civil conspiracy there must
be:
(1) one or more persons, and for this purpose
a corporation is a person;
(2) an object to he accomplished;
(3) a meeting of the mind on the subject
or course of action;
(4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and
( 5) damages as the proximate result thereof."
(270 P.2d at 196).
In applying these elements to Judge Croft's findil:
and to the record, the following elements can be establishec
1.

Two or more persons.

At least Dahle, Maser,

Erickson, Zarbock and Plumbers Supply acted in combination.
Since Zarbock was president and sole owner of Plumbers suppi
all acts of the company were by him.
2.

· he d .
An object to be accomp 1 lS

There were at

the very least two i terns diverted by respondents from appeL
hl'
ant's business prior to the terminating of respondents oa ·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Erickson, Maser and Sadler from appellant's employment,
all as found by the Court.

This activity strongly suggests

the object of the conspiracy to be the destruction of appellant's ability to compete with respondents in their subsequent employment;
3.

A meeting of the minds.

Employee-respondents

Dahle, Maser, Erickson and Sadler collectively left the employ
of appellant in accord with a prior agreement among themselves
~d

with respondentsPlumbers Supply and Zarbock.

They per-

formed collective actions contrary to the interests of
appellant.

For example, the respondents agreed to the use

of an announcement publicizing their new employment and
agreed upon a common resignation date;
4.

One or more unlawful acts.

Several unlawful

overt acts were found by the court and the record supports
the following additional acts and incidents which occurred
prior and subsequent to respondents' termination of employment with appellant:
a.

The respondents established a busi-

ness directly competing with appellant, in breach
of their fiduciary obligation to appellant as defined
in the Hoggan case.
b.

Respondents' conversion and destruction of

documents and records belonging to appellant, as shown
in the record, constituted an unlawful act in breach
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-13-OCR, may contain errors.

of their duty to the appellant.
Southern California Disinfecting Company v. Lomkin,

183 Cal. App.2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43, 53 (1960).
c.

In addition to the destruction and con-

version of documents of appellant, the respondents
used or rendered useless records and documents of
the appellant to further their own business interests.
This has been held to be an improper action on the
part of a former employee.

Abbott Redmont Thinlite

Corporation v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1973).
The. court in that case stated:
"The use of specific information on deals
in progress obtained while in Abbott's
employ, and the degree of likelihood that
but for Redmont's competition Abbott would
have been awarded the contract, dictate
our holding that Redmont violated his fiduciary obligations to Abbott by submitting
competing bids."
(emphasis by the court)
475 F.2d at 89.
d.

It is undisputed that all respondents re-

viewed and permitted the delivery of a notice to appellant's customers stating that the employee respondents
had a "new phone number" and would continue to provide
"the same fine service".

The solicitation of many,

if not all, of appellant's customers occurred before
the respondents had even left the employ of appellant.
This type of solicitation by employees in contemplation
of setting up their own business is a breach of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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employees'

fiduicary duty to the employer.

Equip-

ment Advertiser, Inc. v. Harris, 136 N.W.2d 302
(Minn. 1965).
e.

Zarbock invested approximately $300,000

in the new venture without any independent market
study or pre-testing of the market.

He also anti-

cipated impending sales to be equal to those of
appellant although appellant had been in the market
many years.

These facts alone require the conclusion

that Zarbock would have been unwilling to take such
serious risks unless he had the assistance and assurance of someone like respondent Dahle, who undoubtedly
rendered such assistance while he was still employed
by appellant.

Dahle's assistance to Zarbock in direct

competition with appellant violated Dahle's duty of
loyalty to appellant as his employer.
f.

Dahle made a statement (found proven by

the lower court) to the effect that if respondent
Sadler were retained beyond April 30, 1976, she
might divert business to Plumbers Supply.

This was

in furtherance of the conspiracy of respondents and
in violation of her fiduciary obligation to appellant.
g.

Dahle gave advice in negotiation with

suppliers on behalf of Plumbers Supply relating to
purchases for inventory at a time when Dahle was
expected to maintain and control the inventory of
appellant, resulting in dual conduct.

In this dual

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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role, Dahle apparently established equal inventory positions between appellant and its then
unknown competitor, Plumbers Supply, to cover
all of the same market and directed at the same
potential customers.

The court in Southern Cali-

fornia Disinfecting Company, supra, found similar
actions by an employee, who solicited his employer's
customers and assisted a future employer to establish
a competing business whilt still in the employ of
his original employer, to be improper.

The court

found that these actions constituted unfair competition.

The court stated:

"That the privilege of competition is limited
by the nature of things by a legal standard
of fairness to the method of competition and
the motive of the competitor. Any abuse of
the privilege is the basis for imposeing liability. Standards change as public policy
changes with reference to competition in
business as business is modified by social
and economic conditions; however, deception
has always been and is now recognized as bad
conduct." 7 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
The respondent Dahle's actions here at least constitute
unfair competition and deception in violation of his duty
to appellant.
5.

Damages.

Damages as found by the lower court

·
· ns oi
were limited to the loss occasioned by the two d~verslO
In add •; tion, there
4 which a!'
are further damages as explained above under No. '

orders by respondents, foun d as proven.

compensable under Utah law.

This is more fully discussed

in Point III below.
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The court's thesis that the

same results

would have occurred regardless of what the four employee
respondents might have done after leaving appellant ignores
the court's own conclusion on the record after questioning
the witness, Stinson;

(III 52-19).

"The Court:
If these four people had been wiped out
in an accident, the result would have
been the same, wouldn't it, as far as
your sales are concerned?
The Witness:
Are you asking me for my opinion, if they
would be wiped out?
The Court:
Maybe that is not a fair question.
The Witness:
We wouldn't have the competitor
The Court:
If they are not around to compete, maybe that
is the difference. You may step down."
The fact_that these respondents were "around to compete" and
that they established the competition at a time they were
employed by appellant and through the use of appellant's
Proprietary information (or the non-use and destruction of
the proprietary information that prevented appellant's use
of it) are critical facts pointing to extensive damages in
this case.
Appellant's good will, its established procedures for
documentation relating to future water works sales, its inventory
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listings and sales projections were indisputably prop ·

netar·

Abbott Redmont Thinli te Corporation, supra, at 89.

Whether

Dahle either prepared, maintained or had custody of the for:
going documents during the course of his employment, it is
axiomatic that the former employee respondents were at leas:
expected to prepare the same accurately and perform their
services in a manner reasonably calculated to maintain the
business of the appellant at the expected level.

Upon the

court 1 s finding that the employee respondents breached thei:
responsibilities to appellant in diverting items of busines:
to Plumber Supply, it was

incumbent upon the court to make

a determination that the respondents breached their respon·
sibilities with respect to the treatment of the proprietary
information which they possessed and with respect to the
fiduciary obligation under which they performed.

The maiiir

of a notice by respondents implying a new telephone number
and promising continuing good service were at the very leas:
an improper, if not illegal appropriation of the
of appellant.

good will

That act was certainly a breach of their dut]

of loyalty to the appellant as their employer.

Similarly,

1

the destruction and breakdown of appellant s established
documentation procedures through the removal and destructior.
of documents, e.g., sales manuals, computer print outs, cata·
.
intent
logs, by one or more of the respondents ev1dences an
Further,
to hinder the continuance of appellant's business.
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the purchasing of apparently equivalent inventories for
appellant and PlumbexsSupply at a time when respondents
knew that they were leaving the employ of the appellant
is additional independent evidence of an intention to injure
appellant's business rather than maximizing the soundness
of appellant's business pursuant to their fiduciary
obligations.
The lower court's limited analysis completely
avoids the fact that appellant was an established supplier
in the market and that Plumbers Supply was, at least for
competitive purposes in the water works area, a new entrant.
It also avoids the fact that the respondent employees were
in a position which required their loyalty to the appellant
rather than to Plumbers Supply.

The findings of the trial

court and the evidence contained in the record compel a
conclusion that the respondents conspired to injure appellant;
therefore, they should be required to fully compensate the
appellant for the harmful effects of their conspiracy.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT

TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS AND OTHER DAMAGES
WHICH NATURALLY FOLLOWED FROM THE RESPONDENTS' ACTIONS.
The measure of damages in the instant case has
been settle dby this court in the case of Hoggan & Hall &
Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, supra.

In the Hoggan case this Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding-19for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

affirmed an award of damages for loss of anticipated profits from

projected sales.

The Court states:

"To say that the company lost nothing by the
hypothecation of such accounts because the
~ompany wa~ having some financial difficulty
~s to fly ~n the teeth of logic, -- those
very accounts may have been the difference
between corporate survival or death."
414 P.2d at 92.
The court below failed to award damages for loss
of anticipated profits resulting from expected and projectt
sales.

In tort actions the common measure of damages to bt

assessed against all joint tort feasors includes all damage'
incurred as a natural consequence of the defendants' actior.'
In Beverly v. McCullick, 211 Kan. 87, 505 P.2d 624 (1973),
damages were held proper where the defendant conspired to
injure plaintiff's livestock auction business, the court
stated:
"Conspiracy is a tort and all injuries and
losses that are the natural and probable
results of wrongful and tortious acts are
recoverable." 505 P.2d at 633.
The losses suffered by appellant extend far beyor.c
the damages awarded in the court below.

The respondent·

conspirators, acting to impair the future ability of appell>

to compete with them, actively diverted business from appell'
resigned from appellant's employment en mass, made use of
privileged and proprietary information of appellant to com·

pete against appellant in gaining new customers, an d destro'<''
valuable property belonging to the appellant.

-20-

The overall
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effect of these actions on appellant's business was testified to by the witness Mr, Bray.
~t's

He concluded that appell-

water works business was drastically off beginning in

May and extending through June.

He fu~ther testified that,

but for the acts of respondents, the period in which impact
from lost sales would have been felt would not have been for
ninety days.

The appellant suffered a loss of ability to

fill present contracts as well as compete for future contracts.*
Where such acts on the part of the respondents as indicated
above have been shown, the proper compensation for the appellant far exceeds the damages awarded by the court below.
The proper measure of damages was explained in
Duane Jones, Co. , supra, as follows:
"If plaintiff established wrongful conduct
by defendants as alleged in the amended
complaint--and the jury found that it did-it was entitled to recover as damages the
amount of loss sustained by it, including
opportunities for profit on the accounts
diverted from it through defendants' conduct."
117 N.E.2d at 247.
The proper measure of damages in the instant case
includes the losses, proven at trial, for the months of May
through July together with the damages sustained in the remainder
of the 12 month period following the tortious conduct of
respondents.

At trial these latter damages could only be

projected whereas upon remand they can be more precisely
established.
*It has been over a year and appellant still has not recovered
the business set backs caused by the respondents' actions.
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The proper measure of damages must be determined
by the Court upon a review of the evidence.

Uncertainty as

to the amount of damages is not a basis for denying damages,
Reid v. Mass, 155 Cal. App.2d 293,318 P.2d 54 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957), reh denied,

(1957), hearing denied, (1958).

In the Reid case, former employees of plaintiff initiated

a

competing business enploying additional former employees
of plaintiff and solicitated business from plaintiff's
customers through the use of proprietary information
while employed by plaintiff.

gain~

The defendants alleged that

no precise determination of damages could be made and there·
fore, there was no sufficient basis to award consequential
damages.

The court held to the contrary saying:
"[I] t is clear that some damage to plaintiff's
business was being caused by defendant and
'one whose wrongful conduct has rendered diffi·
cult the ascertainment of the damages cannot
escape liability because the damages could not
be measured with an exactness."
(Citation
omitted.)
318 P.2d at 64.
It is apparent that the court below did not find

consequential damages or lost profits from respondents' bre:
of responsibilities since respo~dents' sales were made thro:
competitive bidding.

The court therefore apparently foun'

that despite the collective action and breaches of respon·
sibility against appellant in violation of their fiduciarY
duty, as alleged, respondents in any event could do no more
than bid in the market place.

-22-

It is submitted, however'
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t~

the focus of the court was required to be directed at the
damages appellant suffered through respondents' action and
not upon the fruits respondents' expected therefrom.

Hoggan,

supra, at 92.
Based on these principles of law concerning the
rreas.J[eOf compensatory damages for the conunission of torts,

we

trial court erred in not granting damages for the loss

of business and business opportunities that were suffered
by

the appellant as a consequence of the respondents' actions.

Therefore, the case should be remanded to the court below
for a determination of the amount of loss suffered by appellant and an award to appellant based on that finding.
POINT IV
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS
PERFORMED UNLAWFUL ACTS PROVIDES SUFFICIENT BASIS TO AWARD
APPELLANT PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The court below acted contrary to the evidence in
refusing to award appellant punitive damages based on the
actions of the respondents.

The lower court reviewed and

approved the granting of a temporary restraining order.

It

also specifically found that respondents had diverted some
of appellant's orders and had improperly taken certain materials belonging to appellant.

Implicit in this finding is

the finding of unlawful intention to hinder and destroy
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appellants' ability to compete.

It is well settled law

that where conspirators act with malice, the plaintiff
is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

(See. e.g.

Beverly v. McCullick, supra, at 634 (1973), SouthemCal.
Disinfecting v. Lomkins, supra at 56 .)

The fact that

the respondents knew their actions to be wrongful but
nonetheless wantonly carried them out is an adequate basis
for awarding punitive damages.

This has been expressed as

follows:
"There must be, in order to justify punitive
damages, some element of wantonness of bad
motive, but if one intentionally does a
wrongful act and knows at the time that it
is wrong, he does it wantonly and with bad
motive." Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6,
17 (Mo. App. 1971)
There is substantial evidence in the record showir.:
malice on the part of respondents.

For instance, the acts

of destroying plaintiff's records, diverting orders to a
competitor, solicitating of appellant's customers while

still employed by appellant, entering a business competing '
with appellant before the termination of their employment
with appellant, and their simultaneous resignation, all point
to such malice.
Utah case law approves punitive damages when the
defendant has acted maliciously or with intent to injure the
plaintiff.

This court stated in Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah

2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963), that:
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1

"w"hether [punitive] damages are awardable
is not dependent upon the classification
of the wrongful act, not upon the nature
of the injury, but upon the manner and
intent with which it is done.
If the
wrongful act by which one injures another
is done willfully and maliciously, our law
allows the imposition of punitive damages
as a punishment to the defendant for such
conduct and as a warning to him and others
against it.
379 P.2d at 382.
The record is sufficiently clear that the respondents in the
instant

case sought to damage appellant's ability to compete.

This is aggravated by the fiduciary position of the respondent
employees and the breach of their duty in that regard.

The

activities of Zarbock and Plumbers Supply both in conspiring
to compete unfairly with appellant and in conspiring with
the employee-respondents to breach their duty to appellant
constitute intentional and wanton action.

The various

actions of the employee-respondents were performed maliciously
and intentionally.
The court below failed to review the actions of
the respondents in the context of their fiduciary obligation
and the conspiracy in which they participated.

Consequently,

the court was unable to fully appreciate the seriousness of
their conduct and has not considered the complete basis for
awarding punitive damages.
Based on the unusual facts of this case and the
outrageous actions of the respondents conduct, this cause
should be remanded to the court below with instructions to
award appellant such punitive damages as may be found equitable.
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SUMMARY
The proveable misconduct of the various responder,:
may well be only the tip of an iceberg.

Two specific acts

of diverting business to respondent Plumbers Supply away
from appellant may be only two of many such acts perpetrate;,
by respondent-employees prior to their departure from appell
The items found destroyed may well be only a small portion
of materials belonging to appellant which respondents dest·
royed.
Certainly several facts pointing to the rest of
the iceberg were proven.

Respondents Zarbock and Dahle ex·

pected in the first few months of operation of an essentiali:
new business to have the same sales as appellant had proj ected for the same period.

close.

Surpri zingly,

they carne very

Appellant expected after the loss of key employees

to feel the decline only after

ninety days.

It carne instan:!

Appellant found a great many important documents and catalom
missing which no one can account for.
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that
appellant is entitled to more than lost profits on the
two items found diverted.
on all lost sales.
helped.

It is entitled to its lost profit:

The relief through injunction might have

Now that relief would not help appellant but onlY

punish respondents.

The better route is to now give app-

ellant its lost profits for the period from May 1976 toMaY
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l

1977.

In addition, it is entitled to punitive damages.
Respectfully submitted,

K·rton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle
36 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
(801)521-3680
KENNETH SCHNAPER
Crane Company
300 Park Avenue
New York, New York

10022
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Richard S. Nemelka
Attorney at Law
Suite 401
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84111
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